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We examine market response to changes in the annual “Dogs of the Dow” (DOD) portfolio. Specifically, we explore stock prices and trading volumes of the Dow stocks that are newly included into or excluded from the DOD portfolio. Although the historical performance of this popular dividend-driven investment strategy is subject to debate, our study focuses on investigating Harris and Gurel’s (1986) “noninformation-motivated demand shifts” in the sample of DOD additions and deletions. Utilizing standard event study methodology over the period 1996–2016, we find evidence that a Dow stock experiences a significant but temporary increase (decrease) in price when it is newly included into (excluded from) the DOD portfolio. Price reversals occur within one week of the reconstitutions. We also find that trading volumes temporarily increase following both index additions and deletions. The results support the price-pressure hypothesis as the DOD reconstitutions do not generally convey new information.

The issue of risk premium in commodity futures market has long been examined since Keynes’ (1930) normal backwardation hypothesis. We further examine the normal backwardation hypothesis in the gold futures market, using a Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) approach. We find no evidence that risk premium exists in the gold futures market over the period 1980–2005. Finally, we provide further explanations as to why there is no risk premium in the gold futures market by investigating the actual gold futures positions taken by gold mining firms. We contend that lack of hedging activity by gold miners may explain the lack of risk premium in gold market.

Previous studies show that crude oil is negatively correlated with stocks but has almost the same rate of return as stocks, and so adding crude oil into a portfolio with equities can provide significant diversification benefits for the portfolio. Given the diversification benefit of crude oil mixed with equities, we examine the value effect of crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers. Differing from traditional corporate risk management literature, this study examines corporate derivatives transactions from the shareholders' diversification perspective. The results show that crude oil derivatives transactions by oil and gas producers do impact value. If oil and gas producing companies stop shorting crude oil derivatives contracts, company stock prices increase significantly. In contrast, if oil and gas producing companies initiate short positions in crude oil derivatives contracts, stock prices tend to drop (still significant, but less so). Thus, hedging by producers is not necessarily good. Transaction limitation is shown to be one of the possible sources of the value effect of corporate derivatives transactions.

When a stock is added into the S&P 500 Index, it in effect becomes cross-listed in the Index derivative markets. When index-based trading strategies such as index arbitrage are executed, the component stocks are directly affected by such trading. We find increased volatility of daily returns, plus increased trading volume for the underlying stocks. Utilizing a list of S&P 500 Index composition changes over the period September 1976 to December 2005, we study the market-adjusted volume turnover and return variance of the stocks added to and deleted from the Index. The results indicate that after the introduction of the S&P 500 Index futures and options contracts, stocks added to the S&P 500 experience statistically significant increase in both trading volume and return volatility. Both daily and monthly return variances increase following index inclusion. When stocks are removed from the index, though, neither volatility of returns nor trading volume experiences any significant change. So, we have new evidence showing that Index inclusion changes a firm's return volatility, and supporting the destabilization hypothesis.

Unionization is generally thought to improve employee welfare through higher compensation and benefits. However, managers of unionized firms have incentives to manage earnings downward to avoid sharing rents with unionized workers, which may explain why empirical findings on the association between unionization and employee compensation are mixed. This paper develops an analytical model incorporating earnings management into the relationship between newly unionized firms and employee compensation.

The authors develop an analytical model that relies on Nash bargaining theory and signal jamming (Stein, 1989; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and Sridhar, 2004) and model a setting where newly unionized workers' collective bargaining power increases substantially. The authors' model analyzes the relationship between newly unionized firms and employee wages and benefits while incorporating firms' incentives to engage in earnings management.

The authors find that newly unionized firms are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management to avoid paying higher salaries and wages to workers. Further, the authors find that this association is more pronounced when (1) the correlation of firms' earnings across periods is higher, (2) the cost of earnings management is lower and (3) firms' earnings are more volatile.

This is the first paper to analytically model the effect of new unionization on firms' earnings management and workers' welfare. The authors' model offers new cross-sectional predictions that have not been tested in the prior literature. Specifically, the authors show that newly unionized firms are more likely to engage in income-decreasing earnings management; when earnings are more highly correlated, the cost of earnings management is lower and earnings are more volatile. The authors' findings may be relevant to regulators and policymakers.